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ABSTRACT
The explosive growth of social networking has placed enormous
pressure on one of the most fundamental of American institutions—the
impartial jury. Through social networking services like Facebook and
Twitter, jurors have committed significant and often high-profile acts of
misconduct. Just recently, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed a death
sentence because a juror Tweeted about the case during deliberations. In
light of the significant risks to a fair trial that arise when jurors
communicate through social media during trial, judges must be vigilant
in monitoring for potential outside influences and in deterring
misconduct.
In this Article, we present informal survey data from actual
jurors on their use of social networking during trial. We discuss the rise
of web-based social networks like Facebook and Twitter, and the
concerns that arise when jurors communicate about a case through
social media before returning a verdict. After surveying how courts have
responded to jurors’ social media use, we describe the results of the
informal survey. The results support a growing consensus in the legal
profession that courts should frequently, as a matter of course, instruct
jurors not to use social media to communicate about trial. Although
others have stressed the importance of jury instructions in this area, we
hope that the informal survey data will further the dialogue by providing
an important perspective—that of actual jurors.
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INTRODUCTION
The explosive growth of social networking has placed enormous
pressure on one of the most fundamental of American institutions—the
impartial jury. In recent years, social networking services like Facebook
and Twitter have become frequent vehicles through which jurors commit
misconduct.1 Just months ago, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed a
death sentence because a juror Tweeted during deliberations.2 In light of
the significant risks to a fair trial that arise when jurors communicate
through social media,3 judges must be vigilant in monitoring for potential
outside influences and in deterring misconduct.4
1

See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 739 F.
Supp. 2d 576, 609 n.215 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (stating that juror misconduct on the
Internet has “become a recurring problem”). We use the phrases “social
networking” and “social media” interchangeably throughout our discussion.
2
Dimas-Martinez v. State, No. CR 11-5, 2011 WL 6091330, at *1 (Ark. Dec. 8,
2011); see also Jeannie Nuss, Death Row Inmate Gets New Trial After Juror
Tweet, USA TODAY (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/s
tory/2011-12-08/juror-tweet-death-row/51 741370/1 (“The Arkansas Supreme
Court . . . tossed out a death row inmate’s murder conviction and said he
deserves a new trial because one juror slept and another tweeted during court
proceedings.”).
3
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State”); United States v. Fumo, 655
F.3d 288, 303–08 (3d Cir. 2011) (summarizing defendant’s argument that
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In this Article, we present informal survey data from actual
jurors on their use of social networking during trial. Section I discusses
the rise of web-based social networks like Facebook and Twitter.
Section II addresses the concerns that arise when jurors communicate
about a case through social media before returning a verdict. After
surveying how courts have responded to jurors’ social media use, Section
III describes the results of the informal survey. The results—which we
stress are not scientific—support a growing consensus in the legal
profession that courts should frequently, as a matter of course, instruct
jurors not to use social media to communicate about trial. Although
others have stressed the importance of jury instructions in this area, we
hope that the informal survey data will further the dialogue by providing
an important perspective—that of actual jurors.

I. THE RISE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
With more than two billion users, 240 million of whom are in the
United States,5 the Internet has enabled global communication,
connectedness and access to information on a scale never before seen in
human history.6 The Internet provides access to vast amounts of
information in mere seconds, and most recently, has allowed users to
“comments on Facebook and Twitter brought widespread public attention to the
jury’s deliberations, creating a ‘cloud of intense and widespread media coverage
. . . and [the] public expectation that a verdict [wa]s imminent[,]’ thereby
violating his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial”).
4
See, e.g., United States v. Juror No. One, No. 10-703, 2011 WL 6412039, at *6
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2011) (“Courts must continually adapt to the potential effects
of emerging technologies on the integrity of the trial and must be vigilant in
anticipating and deterring jurors’ continued use of these mediums during their
service to the judicial system.”).
5
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, INTERNET USERS (2009),
available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2.
6
See John N. Greer, Square Legal Pegs in Round Cyber Holes: The NSA,
Lawfulness, and the Protection of Privacy Rights and Civil Liberties in Cyber
Space, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 139, 140 & nn.2–3 (2010) (“The World Wide
Web . . . has made us more interconnected than any time in human history.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Internet has even changed modern
language. See ‘Google,’ ‘Unibrow’ Added to Dictionary, USA TODAY (July 6,
2006),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/offbeat/2006-07-06-new-words_x.htm
(“Merriam-Webster’s lexicographers have been largely preoccupied with
technology and computers . . . . [And] have given formal definition to . . . the
Internet’s most recognizable names.”); Barry Schwartz, Google Now a Verb in
the Oxford English Dictionary, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH, June 29, 2006,
http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2058373/Google-Now-A-Verb-In-TheOxford-English-Dictionary.
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broadcast their thoughts to millions while receiving near instantaneous
responses through web-based “social networking” or “social media”
services.7
These services, which include well known social networks like
Facebook and Twitter, refer broadly to web-based platforms that allow
individuals “to create a ‘profile’ of themselves and connect or link to
others based upon overlapping interests, employment, schools or
contacts.”8 The defining feature of social networking, for our purposes,
is that it enables users to communicate with almost anyone, at any time,
from anywhere.
This extraordinary ability to broadcast oneself and connect with
others has transformed the utility of the Internet for many Americans.9
Nielson recently reported that social networking websites have begun to
“dominate Americans’ time online,” accounting for “nearly a quarter of
total time spent on the Internet.”10 The exponential growth of social
networking—in terms of both number of users and services—has
prompted some to declare the makings of a “social media revolution.”11

7

See, e.g., Jason H. Casell, To Tweet or Not to Tweet: Juror Use of Electronic
Communications and Social Networking Tools, 15 No. 5 J. INTERNET L. 1, 1
(2011) (“[A]s we enter the next decade of the 21st century, the ubiquity of
instant electronic communication and mobile applications for social networking
sites such as Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, and LinkedIn allow jurors to research
the issues in the cases for which they serve, as well as to immediately interact
with others.”).
8
Christopher B. Hopkins, Internet Social Networking Sites for Lawyers, 28
TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 12, 12 (2009). Some have offered more technical definitions.
See, e.g., Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition,
History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMP.-MEDIATED COMM. 1 (2007),
http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html
(defining
social
networking as a web-based tool that permits a user to “(1) construct a public or
semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users
with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of
connections and those made by others within the system”).
9
See, e.g., Lisa Hoover, How Social Media Has Changed Society, PC WORLD,
Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.pcworld.com/article/162719/how_social_networking_
has_changed_society.html.
10
STATE OF THE MEDIA: THE SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT, THE NIELSEN CO. 1
(2011) [hereinafter NIELSEN REPORT] (further reporting that nearly 80% of all
Internet users access social media websites).
11
Karen North, Steve Jobs and the Rise of Social Media, CNN OPINION, Oct. 7,
2011, available at http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/07/opinion/jobs-socialmedia/index.html.
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Perhaps the most popular online social network is Facebook, a
web-based “social utility that helps people communicate more efficiently
with their friends, family and coworkers.”12 Facebook connects users by
allowing them to “friend” each other, comment on other users’ “walls,”
and post images and other media for the world to see.13 Founded in
2004, Facebook currently has more than 800 million active users.14 Its
growth statistics are staggering:15
Date
December 2004
December 2005
December 2006
December 2007
December 2008
December 2009
December 2010
December 2011

Number of Active Users
1,000,000
6,000,000
12,000,000
58,000,000
145,000,000
360,000,000
608,000,000
845,000,000

Rate of Annual Growth
-600.00%
200.00%
483.33%
250.00%
248.28%
168.89%
138.98%

According to Facebook, each of its active users has an average of
130 “Facebook friends,” and maintains an average of 80 connections to
“community pages, groups, and events.”16 More than half of Facebook
users access the service in any given day,17 and as of December of 2011,
more than “425 million monthly active users accessed Facebook on a
mobile device” such as an iPhone.18 Americans spend more time on
Facebook than any other website.19
Despite its popularity, Facebook is far from the only significant
social networking service available to the public. Another example is
Twitter.20 Launched in 2006, Twitter “is a social networking and microblogging service” that, as one court described,
12

Factsheet, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAre
aId=22 (last visited Jan. 25, 2012).
13
Id.
14
Timeline, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAre
aId=20 (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
15
Id.
16
Statistics, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/press/info.php (last visited
Jan. 12, 2012).
17
Id.
18
Marguerite Reardon, Does Facebook Have a Mobile Problem?, CNET, Feb.
2, 2012, http://news.cnet.com/8301-30686_3-57370105-266/does-facebookhave-a-mobile-problem/.
19
See NIELSEN REPORT, supra note 10, at 1.
20
See Ebony Nicolas, A Practical Framework for Preventing “Mistrial by
Twitter,” 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 385, 386 (2010) (“Twitter is a
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invites its users to answer the question: “What are you doing?”
Twitter’s users can send and read electronic messages known as
“tweets.” A tweet is a short text post (up to 140 characters)
delivered through Internet or phone-based text systems to the
author’s subscribers. Users can send and receive tweets in several
ways, including via the Twitter website.21

A user’s “Tweets” are public Internet postings for all to see (unless the
user activates certain privacy settings).22 Although Twitter does not
publish specific demographic data about its users, it appears that Twitter
users, as a general group, “tend to value feeling connected to many
people, exchanging information in a timely manner, and learning new
things from and about other people.”23
Twitter, like Facebook, is growing at an astonishing rate. In
April of 2010, Twitter representatives reported at “Chirp,” the official
Twitter developer conference, that new users were accessing Twitter at a
rate of 300,000 per day.24 By March of 2011, Twitter had approximately
200 million users.25 According to recent reports, Twitter users send 350
billion Tweets each day,26 and the Twitter network has a “long-term goal
of exceeding 1 billion active users.”27
Beyond Facebook and Twitter, still other social networking
services command hundreds of millions of users. A relatively new
relatively new techno-social phenomenon that pushes the boundaries of
traditional rules concerning juror misconduct and technology in the
courtrooms[.]”).
21
United States v. Shelnutt, No. 09-CR-14, 2009 WL 3681827, at *1 n.1 (M.D.
Ga. Nov. 2, 2009).
22
About Twitter, TWITTER, http://www.twitter.com/about (last visited Jan. 25,
2012).
23
Nicolas, supra note 20, at 378.
24
Jason Kincaid, Twitter has 105,779,710 Registered Users, Adding 300K A
Day, TECHCRUNCH, Apr. 14, 2010, http://techcrunch.com/2010/04/14/twitterhas-105779710-registered-users-adding-300k-a-day; see also Twitter User
Statistics REVEALED, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 23, 2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/14/twitter-user-statisticsr_n_537992.html.
25
Charlie White, Reaching 200 Million Accounts: Twitter’s Explosive Growth,
MASHABLE, July 17, 2011, http://mashable.com/2011/07/16/twitter-accounts200-million.
26
Id.
27
Michael Liedtke, Twitter Simplifies in Bid to Engage More Users, WASH.
TIMES (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/8/
twitter-simplifies-in-bid-to-engage-more-users/?page=all.
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service, Google Plus, markets itself as a “real life sharing” platform,
commanding more than 90 million users28 and counting.29 Tumblr, a
blogging site that allows users to “effortlessly share anything,” contains
over 40 million individual blogs, which have generated nearly 16 billion
total posts.30 The professional networking website LinkedIn has
approximately 135 million active users,31 and a rapidly growing
community of users who “check in” and share their location with others
via Foursquare, now numbers over 15 million.32

II. SOCIAL MEDIA USE BY JURORS
A. Social Media and the Legal Profession
The legal profession is no stranger to social media.33 As one
article recently observed, “jurors, judges, witnesses, clients and
opponents all use social media, and so too must the savvy litigator, both
to research and prepare their case[.]”34 Indeed, for better or worse,
lawyers are frequently using social media to discover information about
potential jurors,35 opposing counsel, and (less frequently) the judge
28

Mark Milian, Google Says Social Network Has 90M Users, CNN, Jan. 19,
2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/19/tech/social-media/google-plususers/inde
x.html?c=tech.
29
See Ted Thornhill, Google Plus “Will Have More Than 400m Users by the
End of 2012” – Will it Overtake Facebook?, MAIL ONLINE (U.K) (Dec. 30,
2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2080207/Google-Plus-hit400m-users--overtake-Facebook.html (noting that, with “625,000 members”
joining each day, Google Plus “will have more than 400 million users by the end
of 2012”).
30
See About, TUMBLR, http://www.tumblr.com/about (last visited Feb. 26, 2012)
(indicating that 16,484,811,994 total posts existed as of January 25, 2012).
31
Jeff Weiner, 100 Million Members and Counting . . . , LINKEDIN BLOG, Mar.
22, 2011, http://blog.linkedin.com/2011/03/22/linkedin-100-million.
32
About Foursquare, FOURSQUARE, https://foursquare.com/about (last visited
Jan. 25, 2012).
33
See Helen W. Gunnarsson, Friending Your Enemies, Tweeting Your Trials;
Using Social Media Ethically, 99 ILL. B.J. 500, 500–04 (2011) (discussing the
rise of social media and its implications for the practice of law).
34
Nicole D. Galli et al., Litigation Considerations Involving Social Media, 81
PA. B.A. Q. 59, 59 (2010).
35
See, e.g., Carino v. Muenzen, No. L-0028-07, 2010 WL 3448071, at *10 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 30, 2010) (per curiam) (holding that trial court erred
in barring the parties from using the Internet during voir dire); Jamila A.
Johnson, Voir Dire: To Google or Not to Google, ABA LAW TRENDS & NEWS
(2008), available at http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/law
_trends_news_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/litigation_johnson.html (“[I]t
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herself.36 Reporters have used services like Twitter to “live Tweet” from
the courtroom,37 and federal and state courts are beginning to develop a
social media presence.38

B. Risks of Jurors’ Use of Social Media
Despite its potential benefits to the legal profession,39 the rise of
web-based social networking services has “wreak[ed] havoc” in the jury
box.40 This is particularly true where jurors have Tweeted, Facebook
posted, blogged, or otherwise communicated about their jury service
through social networking services during trial.41 The problem has not
is apparent that the decision to Google or not to Google is not clear-cut.”).
Research by Reuters Legal found that the practice of conducting extensive
online searches about members of the prospective jury pool is becoming more
commonplace, yet “lawyers are skittish about discussing the practice, in part
because court rules on the subject are murky or nonexistent in most
jurisdictions.” Brian Grow, Internet v. Courts: Googling for the Perfect Juror,
REUTERS, Feb. 17, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/
17/us-courts-voirdire-idUSTRE71G4VW20110217 (reporting that many law
firms and jury consultants were reluctant to discuss their process of juror vetting
because they “weren’t sure judges would approve”).
36
See Galli, supra note 34, at 60–61 (noting that at least four federal appellate
judges maintain social networking profiles, and suggesting that “[l]itigants
should vet a judge’s social networking profile in advance of trial”) (citing
Deborah Cassens Weiss, Dozens of Judges are Getting LinkedIn, Blogger Notes,
ABA J., Aug. 20, 2009, available at http:www.abajournal.com/news/article/
blogger_finds_dozens_of_judges_with_linkedin_profiles/).
37
See, e.g., Michael Lindenberger, Twitter Moves to Federal Court, CITIZEN
MEDIA LAW PROJECT BLOG, Mar. 2, 2009, http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/
2009/twitter-moves-federal-court.
38
Examples of courts on Twitter include the Illinois Supreme Court, the District
of Columbia Courts, and the Indiana judiciary, to name just a few. See DC
Courts PIO, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/#!/dccourtsinfo (last visited Feb. 26,
2012); IL Supreme Court, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/#!/illinoiscourts (last
visited Feb. 26, 2012); Indiana Courts, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/#!/incourts
(last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
39
See Technology Brings Headaches, Help to Wash. Courtrooms, SEATTLE
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2011), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2016935
842_apwajurortechnology1stldwritethru.html (noting the use of iPads to track
juror attendance and communication).
40
John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials are Popping Up, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A1.
41
Many will recall the 2009 incident in which television personality Al Roker
Tweeted pictures of his jury service to his more than 20,000 followers on
Twitter. After being confronted by the court, and subjected to a barrage of
criticism, Roker apologized, but clarified that he did not Tweet pictures of the
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gone unnoticed. In December of 2010, Reuters reported that the
“explosion of blogging, tweeting and other online diversions has reached
into U.S. jury boxes, raising serious questions about juror impartiality
and the ability of judges to control courtrooms.”42 One year earlier, the
New York Times similarly reported that the “use of BlackBerrys and
iPhones by jurors gathering and sending out information about cases is . .
. upending deliberations and infuriating judges.”43
As these news reports suggest, social networking by jurors
during trial (whether at the courthouse or at home) carries with it a
dangerous potential to undermine the fundamental fairness of trial
proceedings.44 Our jury system rests on the principle that “conclusions
to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in
open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or
public print.”45 This means, among other things, that jurors may discuss
courtroom. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Media Atwitter Over Al Roker’s
Twitter Photos from Jury Duty Wait, ABA J., May 29, 2009,
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/media_atwitter_over_al_rokers_twitter
_photos_from_jury_duty_wait/ (describing Al Roker’s tweet of the jury lounge
and negative reaction); Dareh Gregorian, Oh What a Twit! Tweeting Roker
Sorry for Taking Juror Pix, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 29, 2009, available at
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/regional/item_orPeW3RKHabFGbsbXOYCXI.
42
Brian Grow, As Jurors Go Online, U.S. Trials Go Off Track, REUTERS, Dec.
9, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/08/us-internetjurors-idUSTRE6B74Z820101208 [hereinafter Grow].
43
Schwartz, supra note 40.
44
See, e.g., United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 305 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing
prejudice that may arise from jurors’ use of the Internet during trial); Caren
Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1579, 1590 (2011) (quoting
statement of state supreme court justice that the Internet is “‘one of the biggest
concerns that we have about fair trials in the future’”) (quoting Laura A.
Bischoff, Courthouse Tweets Not So Sweet, Say Judges, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
Feb.
12,
2010,
http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/trial-procedurejudges/13916591-1.html); Hon. Dennis Sweeney, Social Media and Jurors, 43
MD. B.J., 44, 46 (Nov./Dec. 2010) (“While these new social media phenomena
are very recent—for example Facebook was created in 2005 [sic] and Twitter in
2006—they along with the older processes of e-mail messages and texting have
already generated troubling issues for trial courts trying to assure fair trials for
the parties before them.”); Steve Eder, Jurors’ Tweets Upend Trials, WALL ST.
J. L. BLOG (Mar. 5, 2012, 8:10 PM), http://online.wsj.com
/article/SB10001424052970204571404577255532262181656.html (“Courts are
concerned about what users might say online, because it could be construed as
having a bias about the case or reveal information about a trial or deliberations
before they becomes public.”).
45
Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Att’y Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); see also
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) (“[A]ny private
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the case only with each other—and even then, only during
deliberations46—and that jurors must be “‘capable and willing to decide
the case solely on the evidence’” presented at trial, free from any
external influences.47
Judges have long confronted juror misconduct,48 but “the
widespread use of social networking sites, such as Twitter and Facebook,
[has] exponentially increased the risk of prejudicial communication
amongst jurors and opportunity to exercise persuasion and influence
upon jurors.”49 Social media allows jurors to communicate with an
audience larger than ever before, and from the convenience of their
iPhone, iPad, Blackberry, Android, or other mobile devices.50 As the
Third Circuit has explained, “the risk of [a] prejudicial communication
may be greater when a juror comments on a blog or social media website
than when she has a discussion about the case in person, given that the
universe of individuals who are able to see and respond to a comment on

communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during
a trial about the matter pending before the jury is . . . deemed presumptively
prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the
instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full
knowledge of the parties.”).
46
See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 324 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Where the
district court instructs a jury to refrain from premature deliberations . . . and the
jury nonetheless discusses the case before the close of trial, that premature
deliberation may constitute juror misconduct.”).
47
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 738 (1993) (quoting Smith v. Phillips,
455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982)).
48
See, e.g., Caren Myers Morrison, Can the Jury Survive Google, 25 CRIM.
JUST. 4, 8 (2011) (discussing instances of jurors visiting a crime scene,
conducting experiments, and seeking additional information).
49
United States v. Juror No. One, No. 10-703, 2011 WL 6412039, at *6 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 21, 2011) (citing Fumo, 655 F.3d at 305); see also Morrison, supra
note 48, at 11 (“The more people are linked through a complex of contacts,
listservs, dating databases, and friend pages, the more these chance encounters
become likely, causing not only the embarrassment of seeing trial participants in
unexpected contexts, but also possible prejudice to the parties.”); Amanda
McGee, Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-First Century: The Prevalence of the
Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms, 30 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 301,
307–08 (2010) (noting the evolution from traditional instances of investigating
the crime scene or talking about the case with one’s spouse to more
sophisticated means of Internet-based misconduct).
50
Making mobile social media communications even more convenient, Apple
recently integrated Twitter and other networking applications into its iPhone
operating system, iOS 5. See iOS 5: Features that Go Further, APPLE,
http://www.apple.com/ios/features.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
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Facebook or a blog is significantly larger.”51 Knowing this risk, one can
understand the multitude of problems that resulted from the juror who
conducted a Facebook poll about how she should vote during
deliberations.52
Given the nature of social networking, juror communication
about a trial through social media involves a substantial risk that other
users will respond, whether or not the juror intended others do so.
Because these services allow users to respond to each other’s
communications, even one-sided communications can become “very
much public discussions”53—depending on “how others in the
‘Twittersphere’ respond.”54 The Third Circuit recently addressed this
concern:
Not unlike a juror who speaks with friends or family members about
a trial before the verdict is returned, a juror who comments about a
case on the internet or social media may engender responses that
include extraneous information about the case, or attempts to
exercise persuasion and influence.55

In the Third Circuit case, discussed in greater detail below, a juror on the
eve of deliberations wrote a comment on Facebook stating that the juror
was “not sure about tomorrow.”56 A Facebook friend of the juror
responded, without invitation, by asking “why?” to which the juror
responded, “think of the last five months dear.”57
Jurors’ social media communications additionally risk “chill[ing]
robust discussion” in the jury room.58 If members of a jury become
51

Fumo, 655 F.3d at 305.
See, e.g., Guy Patrick, Juror Axed for Verdict Poll on Net, THE SUN (U.K.),
Nov. 24, 2008, http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/article1963544.ece
(reporting that a court dismissed a juror who polled Facebook friends on a child
sexual assault case)
53
Dimas-Martinez v. State, No. CR 11-5, 2011 WL 6091330, at *15 (Ark. Dec.
8, 2011).
54
Nicolas, supra note 20, at 396.
55
Fumo, 655 F.3d at 305.
56
Id. at 298.
57
Id. at 298 n.3.
58
Morrison, supra note 48, at 9 (discussing the risk of “chill[ing] robust
discussion inside the jury room” due to jurors’ fearing that their statements
might end up on the Internet). Cf. id. at 10 (“If the linchpin of the jury’s
legitimacy is that its verdicts are opaque, so all mistakes are hidden from sight,
the facts that increasing numbers of jurors are blogging, revealing the petty
rivalries, potential misapprehension of evidence, and irrelevant matter they
52
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aware that one of their own is publicly communicating about the trial,
those jurors may question the secrecy of the deliberative process and the
protections afforded their discussions. As Justice Carzodo once wrote,
“[f]reedom of debate might be stifled and independence of thought
checked if jurors were made to feel that their arguments and ballots were
to be freely published to the world.”59
Finally, apart from the significant potential for actual prejudice
to the parties, juror communications about the trial through social media
may undermine the public integrity of the judicial system. 60 Our system
of justice “depends upon public confidence in the jury’s verdict,”61 and
the unseemliness of jurors using Facebook or Twitter to discuss their jury
service may spawn public doubt about the capacity of the modern jury
system to achieve justice.

C. Examples of Juror Misconduct
Recent events demonstrate the reality and severity of these
risks.62 Consider the case of the Tweeting juror who sat on a capital jury
actually considered may change the calculus that keeps jury decision making
hidden.”).
59
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).
60
See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 618 (2d Cir. 1997) (“It is
well understood, for example, that disclosure of the substance of jury
deliberations may undermine public confidence in the jury system[.]”) (citing
Note, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARV. L. REV. 886, 889
(1983)). Cf. Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir. 1981) (“[I]f an
intrusion into the jury’s privacy has, or is likely to have, the effect of stifling
such debate, the defendant’s right to trial by jury may well have been
violated.”).
61
United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011); see also
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 21 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting that plain error occurs when an error seriously
affects “‘the integrity of public reputation of the judicial proceedings’”) (quoting
United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)); Turner v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 466, 472 (1965) (discussing and emphasizing the “fundamental integrity of
all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury”).
62
See, e.g., Eder, supra note 44 (reporting a specific example of juror
misconduct on Twitter to "show how the use of social media is disrupting the
jury trial"); Jeannie Nuss, Death Row Inmate Gets New Trial Because of Tweet,
HOUSTON CHRON. (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.chron.com/news/art icle/Deathrow-inmate-gets-new-trial-because-of-tweet-2388661.php (reporting that the
state high court ordered a new trial in a capital case after a juror tweeted about
deliberations); Tweets Cause US Death Tow Conviction to be Overturned, BBC
(U.K.), Dec. 9, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16108000.
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in Arkansas. In Dimas-Martinez v. State,63 the Arkansas Supreme Court
considered the effect of a juror’s mid-trial Tweets in a criminal case that
resulted in a death sentence. The juror’s Tweets included comments
such as “Choices to be made. Hearts to be broken. We each define the
great line.”64 Counsel alerted the trial judge to the Tweets, and the juror
admitted to his misconduct. The trial judge admonished the juror to stop
Tweeting, but did not remove the juror, who subsequently continued to
Tweet.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty, upon which the trial court
imposed a sentence of death.65 The trial court denied the defendant’s
motion for a new trial. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court
reversed, explaining:
[T]his court has recognized the importance that jurors not be
allowed to post musings, thoughts, or any other information about
trials on any online forums. The possibility for prejudice is simply
too high. Such a fact is underscored in this case . . . because one of
the juror’s Twitter followers was a reporter. Thus, the media had
advance notice that the jury had completed its sentencing
deliberations before an official announcement was made to the
court. This is simply unacceptable, and the circuit court’s failure to
acknowledge this juror’s inability to follow the court’s directions
was an abuse of discretion.66

Similar examples abound. Jurors have used Facebook to
“friend” parties, including criminal defendants,67 witnesses, lawyers, and
even each other during trial.68 Others have broadcasted disparaging
63

Dimas-Martinez v. State, No. CR 11-5, 2011 WL 6091330, at *12 (Ark. Dec.
8, 2011).
64
Id.
65
Id. at *1.
66
Id. at *16–17.
67
See Ben Zimmer, Juror Could Face Jail Time for ‘Friending’ Defendant,
USA TODAY (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/201202-07/juror-facebook-friend-defendant/53000186/1 (reporting on a contempt-ofcourt hearing for a juror who asked to be Facebook friends with the defendant).
68
MEGHAN DUNN, JURORS USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA DURING TRIALS AND
DELIBERATIONS: A REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON
COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT 3–4 (Fed. Judicial Ctr., ed.,
Nov. 22, 2011) [hereinafter FJC REPORT]; see also Facebook Request Gets Man
Kicked off Jury, HERALD-TRIBUNE (Sarasota, Fla.) (Dec. 30, 2011),
http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2009/11/online-and-wired-for-justice-why-jurorsturn-to-the-internet-the-google-mistrial; Douglas L. Keene & Rita R. Handrich,
Online and Wired for Justice: Why Jurors Turn to the Internet, THE JURY
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comments about other jurors—like the California juror who posted on
Facebook that she “want[ed] to punch” a fellow juror for cracking her
knuckles.69 Still other jurors have offered their opinions relating to guilt
or innocence,70 including the juror who posted on Facebook that the
defendant was “presumed guilty,”71 and the prospective juror in the
Chandra Levy murder trial who Tweeted, “[g]uilty, guilty . . . I will not
be swayed. Practicing for jury duty.”72 The juror’s conduct in the Levy
case is particularly disconcerting because, as the juror later explained, he
had “merely tweeted out of habit.”73
In another California case, a juror commented on her Facebook
page that “the case just keeps getting weirder” after the defendant was
temporarily quarantined in jail due to a swine flu outbreak.74 A
Connecticut juror wrote on Facebook that jury duty was “boring,” and
pleaded for “[s]omebody [to] get me outta here.”75 That same juror
announced “Guilty :)” on her Facebook page on the day of the verdict.76

EXPERT, Nov. 1, 2009, http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2009/11/online-andwired-for-justice-why-jurors-turn-to-the-internet-the-google-mistrial. For cases
related to this issue, see Juror No. One v. California, No. CIV. 2:11-397 WBS
JFM, 2011 WL 567356, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2011) (communication
between jurors through Facebook during trial); People v. Rios, No. 1200/06,
2010 WL 625221, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 23, 2010) (communication between
jurors and witnesses); Wilgus v. F/V Sirius, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 23, 26 (D. Me.
2009) (juror emailed counsel). Cf. United States v. Forde, 407 Fed. App’x 740,
747 (4th Cir. 2011) (considering allegation of juror misconduct on account of
social media activity by a friend of the juror’s spouse).
69
Facebooking Juror Kicked Off Murder Trial, THE ORANGE COUNTY REG.
(Dec.
2,
2011),
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/juror-329708-trialjudge.html. Even a prosecutor’s Facebook posts have been called into question.
See State v. Usee, 800 N.W.2d 192, 200 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (questioning a
prosecutor’s decision to post publicly on his Facebook account regarding trialrelated issues).
70
FJC REPORT, supra note 68, at 4 (noting that one juror contacted the
plaintiff’s former employee to reveal the likely verdict).
71
Facebooking Juror Kicked Off Murder Trial, supra note 69.
72
Prospective Juror Tweets Self Out of Levy Murder Trial, NBC WASHINGTON,
Oct. 22, 2010, http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Prospective-JurorTweets-Self-Out-of-Levy-Murder-Trial-105553253.html.
73
Id.
74
People v. Turner, No. G042598, 2011 WL 579210, at *6 (Cal. App. 4 Dist.
Feb. 18, 2011).
75
United States v. Ganias, No. 08-CR-224, 2011 WL 4738684, at *3 (D. Conn.
Oct. 5, 2011).
76
Id.
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In a widely reported and particularly egregious case in Illinois, a
juror frequently, after leaving the courtroom, “logged into her blog and
wrote an entry describing the dialogue that took place in the jury room
that day.”77 Her blog posts included information about the demographics
of the jury,78 the identity of the witnesses at trial,79 and the weight of the
evidence at trial.80
The high-profile federal corruption trial of former Pennsylvania
State Senator, Vincent Fumo, sheds further light on the problems
surrounding jurors’ use of social media during federal trials. In United
States v. Fumo,81 prosecutors charged Fumo with numerous counts of
mail and wire fraud, tax evasion, and obstruction of justice, arising out of
Fumo’s activities while in public office.82 Jury selection took place
between September 8 and October 20, 2008, and the ensuing trial “lasted
an additional five months.”83 On March 16, 2009, “after four days of
deliberation,” the jury returned verdicts of guilty against Fumo on all
counts.84
During deliberations, on March 15, 2009, “a local television
station reported that one of the jurors [(“Juror 1”)] had made postings on
both his Facebook and Twitter pages related to the trial.”85 The comment
reported by the media was the juror’s “single comment or ‘tweet’ on
March 13, stating[,] ‘This is it . . . no looking back now!’”86 When Juror
1 heard the television report that night, he “panicked and deleted the
comments from his Facebook page.”87 The parties subsequently learned
that “Juror 1’s Facebook comments appeared over the many months of
77

Keith Ecker, Juror Use of Social Media, Blogs Compromises Cases,
LAWYERS.COM, Dec. 2, 2011, http://blogs.lawyers.com/2011/12/juror-use-ofsocial-media-blogs-compromises-cases.
78
Id. (“So our jury consists of a fireman, a dressmaker, a bar manager, a guy
who just finished college, two office managers, a special education teacher, a
trade, a freelance writer (me!), and five others, including two alternatives . . . .
We have ten woman and four men; ten white and four black.”).
79
Id. (“The last witness for the plaintiff was the plaintiff herself, the widow of
the allegedly wrongfully dead guy.”).
80
Id. (“At times during [the plaintiff’s] testimony, there were tears rolling down
the face of the juror sitting in front of me, and I don’t think she was alone.
Sympathy won’t win their case—but it sure doesn’t hurt.”).
81
United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2011).
82
Id. at 296–97.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 297.
85
Id. at 298.
86
Id.
87
Id.
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the trial,”88 and included the following, as summarized by the Third
Circuit:
Sept. 18: (apparently upon a continuance of the trial due to judge’s
illness): “[Juror 1] is glad he got a 5 week reprieve, but still could
use the money . . . .”
Jan. 11: (apparently referring to the end of the government’s case):
“[Juror 1] is wondering if this could be the week to end Part 1?”
Jan. 21: “[Juror 1] wonders if today will really be the end of Part 1?
? ?”
Mar. 4: (conclusion of closing arguments): “[Juror 1] can’t believe
tomorrow may actually be the end!!!” A friend responded to the
March 4 Facebook post by asking “of what?” Juror 1 responded:
“Can’t say till tomorrow! LOL.”
Mar. 8: (Sunday evening before second day of deliberations):
“[Juror 1] is not sure about tomorrow . . . .” A friend responded to
the March 8 Facebook post by asking “Why?” Juror 1 responded:
“think of the last 5 months dear.”
Mar. 9: (end of second day of deliberations): “[Juror 1] says today
was much better than expected and tomorrow looks promising too!”
Mar. 13: (Friday after completion of first week of deliberations):
“Stay tuned for the big announcement on Monday everyone!”89

Upon learning of these comments, the district court questioned
the juror “about his activities on these two websites and his general
media consumption.”90 Juror 1 responded that he “had avoided
television news during the entire trial[, and] had not discussed the
substance of the case with anyone.”91 Crediting the juror’s responses, the
district court “determined that there was no evidence that Juror 1
received outside influence due to his Facebook or Twitter postings and
concluded” that the postings “were ‘nothing more than harmless
ramblings having no prejudicial effect. They were so vague as to be
88

Id.
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 299 (“Juror 1 further stated that he had made the comments ‘for my
benefit to just get it out of my head, similar to a blog posting or somebody
journaling something.’”) (internal record citation omitted).
89
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virtually meaningless.’”92 The trial court subsequently denied Fumo’s
request for a new trial, and Fumo appealed on the basis of juror
misconduct.93
The Third Circuit affirmed.94
The court began by
acknowledging the specific risks that arise when jurors communicate
about a trial through social media,95 and in that regard, “enthusiastically
endorse[d]” the model social media instructions proposed by the United
States Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case
Management (“CACM”).96 In reviewing the decision below, however,
the Third Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
refusal to grant a new trial.97 The court “largely agreed” with the district
court’s characterization of Juror 1’s communications as “meaningless,”
and explained that Fumo failed to advance any plausible argument that
the comments “have led to substantial prejudice against him.”98

III. MINIMIZING THE RISKS OF SOCIAL MEDIA
A. Response from the Bench
Courts have responded to the challenges of social media use by
jurors in a variety of ways.99 In October of 2011, the Federal Judicial
Center (“FJC”) sent a questionnaire to all active and senior federal
district court judges in order to “assess the frequency with which jurors
use social media to communicate about cases during trial and
92

Id. Although less instructive for our purposes, Fumo later filed a second
motion for a new trial, presenting evidence that, on the day of the verdict, “all of
the jurors had heard media reports about Juror 1’s use of Facebook and Twitter.”
Id. The district court rejected this argument without a hearing, and the Third
Circuit found no error in declining to investigate this alleged misconduct. Id. at
299, 304–08.
93
Id. at 302. Fumo appealed on other grounds as well, but we limit our
discussion to the issue of the Facebooking juror.
94
Id. at 294.
95
Id. at 304–05.
96
Id. For a discussion of the CACM model instruction, see infra notes 104-107
and accompanying text.
97
Id. at 307.
98
Id. at 306.
99
The challenges of social media communications do not present themselves
only to courts in the United States. Courts in other countries are grappling with
these same issues. See, e.g., Juror Faces Contempt Proceedings Over ‘Case
Research,’ BBC (U.K.), Nov. 29, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk15939922 (discussing jurors in the United Kingdom conducting trial-related
research on the Internet).
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deliberation,”100 and “to identify strategies judges have found to be
effective and appropriate in curbing this behavior.”101 More than 500
judges responded, and according to the FJC, “most judges have taken
steps to ensure that jurors do not use social media in the courtroom.”102
Only 6% of respondents, or 30 judges, reported that “they have not
specifically addressed jurors’ use of social media.”103
The “great majority of judges” reported having taken affirmative
steps toward risk reduction. These steps differed depending on the
judge, but most of the judges reported that they employ a social media
jury instruction.104 Sixty percent of these judges use the CACM model
instruction, which reads as follows:
[Before Trial:] . . . . Until you retire to deliberate, you may not
discuss this case with anyone, even your fellow jurors. After you
retire to deliberate, you may begin discussing the case with your
fellow jurors, but you cannot discuss the case with anyone else until
you have returned a verdict and the case is at an end. I hope that for
all of you this case is interesting and noteworthy. I know that many
of you use cell phones, Blackberries, the internet and other tools of
technology. You also must not talk to anyone about this case or use
these tools to communicate electronically with anyone about the
case. This includes your family and friends. You may not
communicate with anyone about the case on your cell phone,
through e-mail, Blackberry, iPhone, text messaging, or on Twitter,
through any blog or website, through any internet chat room, or by
way of any other social networking websites, including Facebook,
My Space, Linkedin, and YouTube.

100

FJC REPORT, supra note 68, at 1.
Id.
102
Id. The judiciary is not the only stakeholder that has responded to the risks of
social media use by jurors to trials. Some members of the bar, like Texas
attorney Jason Casell, suggest that trial attorneys, in addition to requesting that
the court take action, employ “passive online monitoring,” through searchable
databases, to detect juror misconduct on the Internet. See Casell, supra note 7,
at 18 (“It is recommended that attorneys monitor social networking activity
throughout the trial and up to the verdict by searching sites such as Facebook,
Twitter, and MySpace; conducting general Internet searches; and establishing
email alerts for key search terms.”).
103
FJC REPORT, supra note 68, at 5.
104
See id. at 6 (noting that 60% of judges surveyed in a study reported that they
“have actually used the model [social media] jury instructions during a trial”);
Nicolas, supra note 20, at 387–93 (discussing various forms of a social media
instruction).
101
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[At the Close of the Case:] During your deliberations, you must not
communicate with or provide any information to anyone by any
means about this case. You may not use any electronic device or
media, such as a telephone, cell phone, smart phone, iPhone,
Blackberry or computer; the internet, any internet service, or any
text or instant messaging service; or any internet chat room, blog, or
website such as Facebook, My Space, Linkedin, YouTube or
Twitter, to communicate to anyone any information about this case
or to conduct any research about this case until I accept your
verdict.105

CACM transmitted these model instructions to every federal district
court judge.106 As described above, the Third Circuit recently
“enthusiastically endorse[d]” these instructions, and “strongly
encourage[d] district courts to routinely incorporate them or similar
language into their own instructions.”107
Beyond jury instructions, some courts have taken “additional
measures . . . to prevent jurors from using social media during trials and
deliberations.”108 These less common methods include courthouse
technology bans,109 threats of contempt,110 and requiring jurors to sign
written pledges not to communicate about the case through social
105

United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 305 (quoting JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT, PROPOSED
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: THE USE OF ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY TO
CONDUCT RESEARCH ON OR COMMUNICATE ABOUT A CASE (Dec.
2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/2010/docs/DIR10018-Attachment.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2012) [hereinafter CACM MODEL
INSTRUCTION]).
106
Memorandum from Judge Julie A. Robinson, Chair of the Judicial
Conference Comm. on Court Admin. and Case Mgmt. to the Judges of the
United States District Courts (Jan. 29, 2010), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/2010/docs/DIR10-018.pdf.
107
Fumo, 655 F.3d at 305.
108
See FJC REPORT, supra note 68, at 7–8 (listing eleven measures judges have
taken to ensure that jurors do not use social media to communicate about a
case).
109
Dimas-Martinez v. State, No. CR 11-5, 2011 WL 6091330, at *17 (Ark. Dec.
8, 2011) (observing “the wide array of possible juror misconduct that might
result when jurors have unrestricted access to their mobile phones during a trial.
Most mobile phones now allow instant access to a [sic] myriad of
information.”).
110
For at least some judges, contempt is not an empty threat. See United States
v. Juror No. One, No. 10-703, 2011 WL 6412039, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2011)
(finding juror guilty of criminal contempt for violation of court’s instructions
regarding email communications).
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media.111 With regard to written pledges, the American College of Trial
Lawyers has proposed the following “Statement of Compliance” for
jurors to sign:112
I agree that during the duration of the trial in _________________,
I will not conduct any independent research into any of the issues or
parties involved in this trial. I will not communicate with anyone
about the issues or parties in this trial, and I will not permit anyone
to communicate with me. I further agree that I will report any
violations of the court’s instructions immediately.
__________________________________
JUROR No. _____

B. Informal Survey Results
Against this background, we set out to learn more about jurors’
use of social networking during trial. Over the past sixteen months,
actual jurors were asked to complete a short survey at the conclusion of
their jury service. The survey asked the following questions regarding
the use of social media:
Were you tempted to communicate about the case through any
social networks, such as Facebook, My Space, LinkedIn, YouTube
or Twitter?
If so, what prevented you from doing so?113

111

FJC REPORT, supra note 68, at 8. This was U.S. District Court Judge Shira
Scheindlin’s approach in an arms trafficking prosecution of a former Soviet
military officer. NY Judge: No Web for Jurors at Society Arms Trial, YAHOO
NEWS (Oct. 5, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/ny-judge-no-jurors-soviet-armstrial-025047790.html. The pledge stated, in relevant part: “I agree to follow all
of the Court’s preliminary instructions, including the Court’s specific
instructions relating to Internet use and communication with others about the
case. . . . I agree not to communicate with anyone about the issues or parties in
this trial, and I will not permit anyone to communicate with me.” Jeffrey T.
Frederick, What is it About ‘Don’t Twitter’ You Do Not Understand?, JURY
RESEARCH BLOG, Dec. 14, 2011, http://www.nlrg.com/blogs/juryresearch/bid/72541/What-Is-It-About-Don-t-Twitter-You-Do-Not-Understand.
112
JURY COMMITTEE, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, JURY
INSTRUCTIONS CAUTIONING AGAINST USE OF THE INTERNET AND SOCIAL
NETWORKING 1, 6 (Sept. 2010) [hereinafter ACTL MODEL INSTRUCTION].
113
Jury Questionnaire (2010–12) (unpublished research) (on file with the Duke
Law and Technology Review).
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Approximately 140 jurors participated, representing jurors from
sixteen criminal and civil trials in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois. All of the jurors sat in cases over which
either Judge Amy J. St. Eve or Judge Matthew F. Kennelly presided. In
each of these cases, the District Judge employed a model social media
instruction during opening and closing instructions. Additionally, in
many of the longer trials, the District Judge admonished the jury daily
not to communicate about the case through social media.
Before discussing the results, a brief comment on methodology.
We acknowledge that the informal survey is not scientific. (We expect a
Daubert challenge from some in the blogosphere.)114 We additionally
acknowledge that although juror participation was voluntary and
anonymous, some jurors may not have been completely candid, for any
number of reasons. Limitations of this type are not unusual.115
Cognizant of these limitations, we believe that the responses
from actual jurors will assist the judiciary and the legal profession in
developing best practices to ensure a fair trial in the face of social
networking. As we explain in more detail below, our key takeaway from
the informal survey is that courts should routinely and frequently instruct
jurors not to communicate about the case through social networking
services, because jurors tend to follow the judge’s social media
instructions.
Of the approximately 140 jurors who participated in the informal
survey, only six jurors reported any temptation to communicate about the
case through social media. One juror stated that she “did want to
research the case,” another stated simply, “Google,” and the four
remaining jurors did not explain the nature of their temptation. Each of
the six jurors, however, reported that he or she did not ultimately
succumb.
The juror tempted to use Google did not ultimately do so,
explaining that she wanted “to keep an open mind.” The juror who
wanted “to research the case” stated clearly that she did not do so,
without additional explanation. Jury instructions appear to have had
significant impact on the four other jurors. Each of these jurors referred
to either the judge’s instructions or the obligations of a juror as the
114

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993) (holding
that a district court has discretion to exclude expert testimony that is not
scientifically reliable).
115
See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 48, at 7 (noting that reports of misconduct
might under-represent the problem).
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reason for their refrain. Specifically, in response to the survey question
about what “prevented you” from using social media, the four jurors
stated, respectively:
•

“the judge”

•

“direct orders”

•

“I morally thought I should obey the judge”

•

“swore not to”

In contrast to the six jurors who were tempted by social media,
the overwhelming majority of jurors—approximately 130 jurors, or 92%
of the sample—reported no such temptation. Some of the jurors were
emphatic about this, stating:
•

“absolutely not”

•

“not at all” (two responses)

•

“NOT AT ALL” (was this juror yelling at us?!116 )

Although most of the jurors responded, simply, “no,” when
asked if they were tempted to use social media to communicate about the
trial, numerous jurors offered further explanation, most often touching
upon the judge’s social media instructions. These jurors’ explanations
included:

116

•

“the Judge’s instructions”

•

“the Judge”

•

“your instructions”

•

“the law”

•

“because the judge instructed us”

•

“was instructed not to do it”

•

“ordered not to look”

•

“the fact that we were not supposed to”

•

“stay true to my given orders”

See Mark Simpson, Tech Etiquette is Just Common Sense, 7 COMMON
GROUND J., No. 2, 81, 85 (2010) (“TYPING IN ALL CAPS IS CONSIDERED
YELLING in electronic environments”).
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•

“I was sworn not to say anything”

•

“direct orders”

•

“your instructions made it clear”

•

“jury instructions”

23

Other jurors referenced principles of fairness, which may have
related to the jury instructions, or arisen from the juror’s pre-existing
notions of fairness. Either way, these jurors explained their forbearance
like this:
•

“it would not be fair”

•

“morally”

•

“didn’t want to sway my opinion”

For another juror, refraining from prohibited social media
communications was a matter of personal pride, relating to her basic
obligation not to discuss the case before deliberations. This juror wrote:
•

“I was proud of the fact that we, as a jury, did not discuss the
case until it came time for deliberations.”

The juror’s specific pride is consistent with the general pride that other
jurors felt through their participation in the process as a whole:
•

“made me feel like I am doing something good”

•

“feeling of citizenship for participation”

•

“great American experience & privilege”

Many jurors explained that they did not use or had no interest in
using social networking services. Despite the growing importance of
social media and the Internet, these responses are an important reminder
that not every juror uses Facebook or Twitter. In the words of these
jurors:
•

“not big on technology”

•

“don’t use any of those”

•

“not on social networks”

•

“I don’t use that too much”

24
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•

“I don’t ‘social network’ anyway”

•

“don’t use those elect. gadgets”

•

“I don’t use social networks much”

•

“not on social networks”

•

“do not like”

•

“not interested”

•

“didn’t want to”

[Vol. 11

Finally, we highlight a handful of unique responses. One juror
lamented, with a smiley face, that she “came home too late” to even
“think about Facebook :).” Another juror, in an apparent reference to the
substance of the trial, wrote that if she had violated the judge’s
instructions, she “would be no better than the police officers for not
following procedures.” Although insisting she did not communicate
about the case through social media, another juror stated that “nothing”
could prevent her from doing so if she had wanted to. Finally, one juror
wrote “jail” as the reason she did not communicate about the case,
presumably in a reference to being held in contempt. While none of the
jurors were advised about the risk of contempt, the contempt authority of
a trial court may well be a matter of general knowledge.117

C. Benefits of Social Media Instructions
Taken together, these informal findings strongly suggest that
social media instructions effectively mitigate the risks of juror
misconduct associated with social media.118 The overwhelming majority
of the jurors—each of whom heard numerous social media instructions—
reported no temptation to communicate about the case through social
media. A significant number referenced the judge or the judge’s
instructions as the reason that they did not so communicate. Even as to
the small minority of jurors who reported some temptation, all but one
explained that the judge’s instructions or the juror’s general obligations
117

See, e.g., Sandy Fitzgerald, Juror Booted for Facebook-Friending Defendant,
MOBILEDIA, Jan. 3, 2012, http://www.mobiledia.com/news/122346.html
(“judges are starting to crack down, threatening jurors with contempt of court
charges if they insist on giving constant updates or contacting defendants”).
118
This appears to be the growing consensus among federal judges. See FJC
REPORT, supra note 68, at 1, 5 (“[M]ost judges have taken steps to ensure jurors
do not use social media in the courtroom. The most common strategy is
incorporating social media use into the jury instructions[.]”).
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to the court prevented them from acting on that temptation. It is also
significant that jurors remembered the judges’ social media instructions,
as this suggests that the instructions made impressions on the jurors.
Consistent with these informal findings, influential entities like
the Federal Judicial Center have recognized social media instructions as
a non-invasive and highly effective practice.119 Courts have great
familiarity with instructing juries, and have traditionally relied on jury
instructions as the primary method of combating juror misconduct and
ensuring a fair trial.120 Employing social media instructions in this
context not only treats jurors with respect,121 but also is consistent with
the long-standing presumption that jurors will follow a judge’s
instructions.122
Courts need not resort immediately to draconian solutions such
as blanket technology bans123 or throwing jurors in jail,124 either of which

119

See id. at 6 (“[T]he model jury instructions appear to successfully affect
jurors’ use of social media during at trial or deliberation.”).
120
See McGee, supra note 49, at 310 (suggesting that the threat of social
networking to the jury is an old problem with a new face).
121
In the informal survey, one juror remarked favorably in her comments that
she was “treated . . . respectfully by the Judge.”
122
See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (“A jury is presumed to
follow its instructions.”); see also Martin v. Royse, No. 1:08-CV-246, 2010 WL
2521063, at *5 (N.D. Ind. June 11, 2010) (rejecting allegation of juror
misconduct on account of alleged Tweets, reasoning that the court instructed the
jury not to communicate about the case on Twitter, and that the juror was
presumed to have followed that instruction).
123
See Tresa Baldas, For Jurors in Michigan, No Tweeting (or Texting, or
Googling)
Allowed,
THE
NAT’L.
L.J.
(July
1,
2009),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202431952628&slreturn=1
(noting not only that Michigan courts have banned all electronic communication
from the jury box, but also that courts in Ramsey County, Minnesota and
Malheur County, Oregon have banned wireless handheld devices from court).
In any event, case law suggests that jurors are more likely to commit misconduct
on their own time, while not under the watchful eye of their fellow jurors or
courthouse personnel. See Mendoza v. Yarbrough, No. CVF035004DLBHC,
2005 WL 1336544, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2005) (involving a juror who went
home, researched the internet and used a dictionary to determine the meaning of
“constructive possession” and “circumstantial evidence”). For this and other
reasons, blanket bans on technology in the courthouse may have only limited
utility.
124
See, e.g., Grow, Juror Could Face Charges for Online Research, REUTERS,
Jan. 19, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/19/usinternet-juror-idUSTRE70I5KI20110119 (indicating that a judge considered
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may impact jurors’ willingness to serve.125 Just as judges did not force
jurors to unplug their televisions or turn off their Satellite radios as those
technologies developed, so should be the general attitude of judges as it
relates to social networking. A social media instruction may not prevent
every instance of juror misconduct on Facebook, Twitter, or otherwise,
and the unique circumstances of some trials might require additional
measures and protections. It has become clear, however, that a social
media instruction is a necessary and often independently sufficient
method for courts to minimize—if not eliminate—the risk of juror
misconduct through social media.

D. Crafting Social Media Instructions
After resolving to employ a social media instruction, judges must
consider when to instruct, and how to instruct. As to timing, courts
should instruct juries early and often. We suggest an instruction in the
judge’s opening remarks to the jury, as a part of the judge’s closing
instructions before the jury begins deliberations, and at reasonable
intervals during trial, particularly those spanning many days.
With regard to content, a good place to start is with the
numerous model social media instructions advanced by entities including
CACM and the American College of Trial Lawyers.126 Many have
offered extensive guidance on the appropriate content of a social media
instruction, so we treat that issue only briefly.
The instruction should be specific.127 Although standard jury
instructions prohibit jurors from discussing or communicating about the
bringing criminal contempt charges against a juror, who had conducted online
research and offered to share her research with other jurors).
125
See, e.g., In re Adams, 421 F. Supp. 1027, 1030 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (“The
courts expect a lot of jurors. They are not professionals but amateurs, brought
out of the security of their homes and their jobs and placed in a position that is
strange to them, in an environment that is at once austere, forbidding and at
times frightening. It is not always possible to give them information as to why
certain things are happening because of the need to protect the decisional
process. Jurors are to be forever thanked for their willingness to serve in this
most important aspect of judicial administration. Judges and lawyers must make
certain that jurors are protected.”).
126
ACTL MODEL INSTRUCTION, supra note 112; CACM MODEL INSTRUCTION,
supra note 105; see also FJC REPORT, supra note 68, at app. C-I (listing
instructions from individual judges).
127
An interesting issue arises when a court instructs jurors what not to search on
the Internet. Compare King v. Grams, No. 05-C-928, 2006 WL 1598679, at *4
(E.D. Wis. June 2, 2006) (denying habeas corpus where petitioner argued that
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case,128 the magnitude of social change occasioned by social media
underscores the need for additional specificity.129 Americans have
become “accustomed to their always-online lifestyle,”130 and for some,
“tweeting and blogging are simply an extension of thinking, rather than a
form of written communication.”131 As the Tweeting juror in the
Chandra Levy trial explained, he had “merely tweeted out of habit.”132
For these reasons, an effective instruction should include more
than “don’t Twitter anybody about this case”133 or “[w]e don’t want any
tweeting or texting.”134 The instruction should instead specifically
“by telling the jury not to do internet searches to find out background
information about the defendant or the victim in the case on sites like ‘Google,’
the judge created the impression that [defendant-petitioner] did in fact have a
criminal background to search for”), with United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d
127, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2011) (suggesting that specific leading question into
juror’s potential exposure to extrinsic information “might itself have ‘create[d]
prejudice’ by implying that a broader search could yield further information”
about the defendant). This issue is beyond the scope of the Article, and we
simply observe that although it may be effective to provide specific examples of
websites, behaviors, and devices that are prohibited, the potential risks of
specifically instructing jurors what not to search on the Internet may outweigh
the benefits of such an instruction.
128
See, e.g., THE COMMITTEE ON PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT, FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT 44 (2009 rev.) (pattern jury instruction: “you are not to discuss this
case with anyone”).
129
See State of Vermont v. Abdi, No. 2010-255, 2012 WL 231555, ¶ 25 (Vt.
Jan. 26, 2012) (“Although Vermont trial courts routinely admonish jurors not to
consult outside sources, it may well be time to consider a stronger and more
technology-specific admonition . . . . We cannot ignore the realities of our
‘information age,’ where the Internet and other technologies have made
information more widely and immediately accessible than ever before.”);
Nicolas, supra note 20, at 395 (“Boilerplate instructions do not seem to go far
enough anymore.”).
130
See, e.g., Grow, supra note 42.
131
Paula Hannaford-Agor, Jury News: Google Mistrials, Twittering Jurors,
Juror Blogs, and Other Technological Hazards, 24 THE COURT MANAGER, No.
2, at 43, available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/cjs/JuryNews
2009Vol24No2.pdf.
132
Prospective Juror Tweets Self Out of Levy Murder Trial, supra note 72.
133
Dimas-Martinez v. State, No. CR 11-5, 2011 WL 6091330, at *15 (Ark. Dec.
8, 2011).
134
Facebooking Juror Kicked Off Murder Trial, supra note 69 (juror posted
Facebook comments, even after trial judge “warned her and all of the other
jurors, as he always does, that they are not to do any independent investigation,
consult any reference material, such as a dictionary, or talk about the case with
anyone else, until deliberations begin . . . . and the biggest evil facing the world
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enumerate the most popular social networking services such as
Facebook, Twitter, and so on, that jurors may use—and have used—to
commit misconduct. Consider the model instruction by CACM:
. . . . You may not communicate with anyone about the case on your
cell phone, through e-mail, Blackberry, iPhone, text messaging, or
on Twitter, through any blog or website, through any internet chat
room, or by way of any other social networking websites, including
Facebook, My Space, LinkedIn, and YouTube. . . .135

An effective social media instruction should also explain itself.
As one judge has remarked: “If jurors are going to be asked to sacrifice
some of their personal freedom and forego their case-specific e-mailing,
texting, blogging, instant messaging, and social networking for the
duration of their service, they are entitled to a clear and thoughtful
explanation of the reason.”136 The American College of Trial Lawyers
seeks to address this concern in its model instruction by explaining the
need for “a fair trial based on the evidence” presented in court.137 The
instruction explains that outside information “might be inaccurate or
incomplete, or for some other reason not applicable to this case, and the
parties would not have a chance to explain or contradict that information
because they wouldn’t know about it.”138 The instruction further
explains that “[a]ny juror who violates [the court’s social media]
restrictions . . . jeopardizes the fairness of these proceedings, and a
mistrial could result that would require the entire trial process to start
over[, which would create a] tremendous expense and inconvenience to
the parties, the court and the taxpayers.”139

today; the internet. Please stay off the internet . . . oh, and tweeting. We don’t
want any tweeting or texting either”).
135
CACM MODEL INSTRUCTION, supra note 105.
136
Hon. Linda Giles, Does Justice Go Off Track When Jurors Go Online?, 55
BOSTON B.J. 7, 9 (Spring 2011).
137
ACTL MODEL INSTRUCTION, supra note 112, at 2–3.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 3.
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CONCLUSION
The challenges of social media are great, but so is the resolve of
the judiciary to protect the guarantee of a fair trial. There is no perfect
solution to the growing risk of jurors committing misconduct through
social networking services like Facebook and Twitter. After all, the jury
is a fundamentally human institution, as one of the jurors in the informal
survey reminded us by stating that “nothing” could prevent her from
communicating through social media during a trial.
In this Article, rather than focus on the circumstances under
which courts must take corrective action on account of juror use of social
media, we observe that such circumstances exist, and that courts must be
proactive in discouraging such misconduct. Anticipatory judicial action
is necessary not only to protect against actual prejudice at trial and avoid
lengthy collateral proceedings, but also to preserve the public integrity of
judicial proceedings.
Based on informal survey data from approximately 140 actual
jurors, we suggest that courts should, as a matter of course, employ
specialized social media instructions at frequent intervals during trial. A
well-crafted social media instruction is effective because, simply put,
jurors listen. In our discussion, we offer specific comments from actual
jurors to elucidate this suggestion, and to provide the legal profession
with a window into the jury box when it comes to social media.
Although our informal survey data is far from scientific, we hope that the
voices of actual jurors will add a unique perspective to the discussion,
and support the growing consensus that social media instructions are a
necessary and often independently sufficient tool to ensure an impartial
jury in the age of social media.

